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Institutionalizing IWRM in Developing and Transition Countries – 
The Case of Mongolia 
 
 
Abstract Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) forms the widely accepted ecosys-
tem approach to manage water and its related resources in a sustainable way. Nevertheless its 
implementation is still lacking behind, especially in developing and transition countries which are 
often short of essential resources and face complex political dynamics. IWRM often requires a 
fundamental realignment of institutions and governance structures. This may lead to problems of 
fit and institutional interplay as particular challenges of multi-level governance. Against this back-
ground a case study of Mongolia was carried out, a transition country suffering from extreme 
climatic conditions and increasing depletion of its resources. While an attempt to introduce 
IWRM exists on paper, it is less clear how it will be made politically and institutionally applicable. 
A document review and stakeholder interviews were carried out in order understand progress and 
problems of introducing IWRM in Mongolia in the face of its transition and decentralization 
process. Problems of fit and interplay were identified as well as approaches for their solution. 
Results show that the decentralization itself has led to problems of fit and interplay. Attempts are 
underway to overcome problems of fit like the establishment of river basin councils which do 
now face challenges concerning their room for manoeuvre. Problems of interplay arise when it 
comes to the cooperation and coordination of numerous water related organisations which often 
leads to inconsistent water governance. 
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1 Introduction: Introducing IWRM in Developing and Transition Countries 
Building upon on the 1992 Dublin Principles, Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) 
today forms the widely accepted paradigm to manage water and its related resources in a sustain-
able way. IWRM highlights the coordinated development and management of water at the water-
shed level (Global Water Partnership 2000). It ideally replaces command-and-control approaches 
and promotes a shift toward participatory, bottom-up decision-making procedures. IWRM thus 
often requires a fundamental realignment of institutions and governance structures (Bandaragoda 
2000; Saleth and Dinar 2000; Rogers and Hall 2003; Dombrowsky 2005; Fischhendler 2008; 
Huitema, Mostert et al. 2009). 
The institutionalization of IWRM may lead to coordination problems which were de-
picted by Young (1999) for global environmental governance and adapted by Moss (2004) for 
water management. These problems encompass at least three dimensions: fit, horizontal interplay 
and vertical interplay. Firstly, it is assumed that institutions are most efficacious the better they 
match the biophysical systems they refer to. Emerging problems of fit that result from a mis-
match of hydrological and administrative borders can be addressed e.g. by establishing river basin 
organisations (Moss 2004; Mitchell 2005; Dombrowsky 2008; Herrfahrdt-Pähle 2010). The hori-
zontal dimension of institutional interplay refers to the inter-sectoral coordination of water re-
lated institutions. Vertical interplay, on the other hand, focuses on interactions of institutions at 
different administrative levels and thus aims at addressing problems of multi-level governance 
(see Figure 1). 
It is assumed that IWRM at best addresses problems of spatial fit and institutional inter-
play simultaneously, but since there will never a perfect balance, Moss (2004: 87) argues that “the 
process of institutionalising river basin management, rather than the end-result, acquires particular 
significance” (own emphasis). This particularly involves “complex negotiation and bargaining 
processes with other parties relevant to water resources management and the creation of new 
partnerships to solve basin specific problems” (Moss 2003: 95). 
In general, the introduction of IWRM remains a considerable institutional challenge. In 
the European Union, the introduction of a river basin management approach is supported by the 
EU Water Framework Directive. But federal countries, such as Germany, where the main re-
sponsibility for water management lies with the federal states, face challenges in its institutionali-
zation as the respective federal states have to work together at the basin scale (Moss 2004; SRU 
2004). It is assumed that the implementation challenges are even greater in developing and transi-
tion countries, because these countries typically lack essential financial, institutional and human 
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resources to facilitate a sustainable water management. In addition, transition countries often face 
rapid institutional change, e.g. through the introduction of a market economy, democratic struc-
tures or decentralization processes, and as such particularly complex political dynamics (see e.g. 
Starnes 2003). A number of case studies on the implementation of IWRM in developing coun-
tries has been carried out (see for example Saleth and Dinar 2000; Björklund 2001; Edig and Edig 
2005; Hedden-Dunkhorst 2005; Klaphake 2005; van der Zaag 2005; Lankford, Merrey et al. 2007; 
Shah 2007; van Koppen, Giordano et al. 2007; Herrfahrdt-Pähle 2010). Significant contributions 
on transition countries concentrated on the agricultural sector and infrastructure systems 
(Theesfeld 2003; Theesfeld and Boevsky 2005; Herrfahrdt, Kipping et al. 2006; Abdullayev 2009; 
Sehring 2009). Little, however, has been contributed on the particular challenges transition coun-
tries face in introducing IWRM as a holistic approach to water management. For these countries, 
there is a need to get a better understanding on how parallel processes of transformation and 
decentralization and the introduction of IWRM affect institutional cooperation and coordination. 
Against this background a case study of Mongolia was carried out, a transition country 
suffering from extreme climatic conditions as well as increasing depletion of its resources. Mon-
golia was transformed into a democracy and market economy in 1990. The transformation of its 
political system includes an ongoing process of decentralization (Lkhagvadorj 2010). Problems 
with regard to water quantity and quality result from its (semi-)arid climate, heavy climate fluctua-
tion and climate change, increasing economic activities particularly in mining and agriculture, and 
out-dated infrastructure. A lavish handling of water in mining, agriculture and domestic use is 
motivated by extremely low water prices. Hence, water supply cannot be secured for all water 
using sectors at all times (FAO 2009). 
Water quality is mainly affected by industrial and domestic uses as well as by agriculture. 
Mining activities produce waste water containing toxic substances which is often fed into rivers 
without treatment. Poor conditions of sanitation infrastructure result in the discharge of infil-
trated waste water into rivers or percolation into groundwater (Dore and Nagpal 2007: 1; NWC, 
pers. comm. 2009). Agriculture and herding produce high nutrient inputs (MoMo 2009). 
The looming situation has been recognized in politics, and while an attempt to introduce 
IWRM exists on paper, it is less clear how the IWRM concept will be made politically and institu-
tionally applicable and operational in Mongolia. This is not least due to the fact that in general no 
blueprint for an ideal water resources management exists. The water sector reform is thus a proc-
ess of trial and error. 
In order to understand ongoing processes, progress and problems of institutionalizing 
IWRM in Mongolia, a document review and comprehensive stakeholder interviews were carried 
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out.1 Based on the assumption that a successful implementation of IWRM implies that a country 
is able to address problems of fit and interplay, several questions were pursued: Which institu-
tional preconditions for an IWRM in Mongolia are in place or being established? Where do prob-
lems of fit and interplay occur and what approaches have been drawn upon to overcome them? 
What are the specific challenges of IWRM in Mongolia in the face of its transition and decentrali-
sation processes?  
Chapter 2 introduces theoretical foundations of the problems of fit and interplay with re-
gard to water management. In Chapter 3 the institutional setup and governance structures of 
Mongolia’s water sector are described. Chapter 4 applies the theory of fit and interplay to the case 
study of Mongolia. Chapter 5 draws conclusions and revisits the expediency of the fit and inter-
play concept in explaining challenges in the institutionalization of IWRM in the light of the case 
study. 
2 IWRM and Problems of Institutional Fit and Interplay – Theoretical Foundations 
Young (1999) introduced the concepts of fit, interplay and scale2 as analytical categories towards 
the study of institutional dimensions of global environmental change. Institutions are principally 
understood as formal and informal rules created to order interpersonal relationships of a society, 
be it between individuals or between and within organisations (North 1990; Ostrom 1990). Build-
ing on Young’s approach Galaz, Olsson et al. (2008) broaden the perspective and look at prob-
lems of fit “between biophysical systems and governance systems of which institutions are a part” 
(ibid.: 168). Besides institutions, governance systems also comprise the respective actors, their 
interaction modes and governance structures (e.g. Scharpf 1997). We will take up this broader 
view in this paper since it allows us to incorporate aspects of Mongolia’s multi-level institutional 
setting. 
Problems of fit may arise as result of a mismatch between institutional and governance 
arrangements dealing with environmental issues and the ecological systems they refer to. They 
thus focus on the interactions between humans and the environment, or social and ecological 
systems. Problems of fit can occur in terms of time, scale or function (Folke, Pritchard et al. 
2007; Herrfahrdt-Pähle 2010).  
With regard to temporal misfits, Folke, Pritchard et al. (2007) state that “because of the 
organizational and temporal complexity of ecosystems, human intervention may have different 
                                                 
1 The research has been carried out in the framework of the International Water Research Alliance Saxony (IWAS), 
funded by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF). 
2 According to Young (1999) the problem of scale deals with the transferability of certain institutional regimes in 
time and space. In this paper we will only focus on the dimensions of fit and interplay as they are most relevant for 
the analysis of problems with the institutionalization of IWRM in a particular case. 
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effects at different times”. For example, due to path-dependencies institutional arrangements may 
need a longer time to change than ecosystems or technologies (Young 2002; Ekstrom and Young 
2009).  
Problems of functional fit relate to the scope of institutions, i.e. it “concerns the failure of 
an institution or a set of institutions to take adequately into account the nature, functionality, and 
dynamics of the specific ecosystem it influences” (Ekstrom and Young 2009). 
Spatial fit refers to the matching of the boundaries of both the ecosystem and the organi-
sation it relates to. Problems may occur when a “lack of fit causes spatial externalities, benefiting 
free riders and harming others beyond the spatial reach of the responsible institution” (Moss 
2004: 87). Figure 1 indicates the misfit between the boundaries of a river basin and of jurisdic-
tions (e.g. countries or provinces). 
 
 
Figure 1: Problems of Fit and Interplay. Source: Moss (2003b: 34, 37). 
 
The conventional answer to problems of fit in water management is the establishment of 
river basin organisations (Moss 2004; Mitchell 2005; Dombrowsky 2008; Herrfahrdt-Pähle 2010). 
This, however, usually requires a realignment of institutional arrangements (i.e. water laws, poli-
cies and organisations) which changes their relations to the water institutional environment 
(Saleth and Dinar 2000). But, firstly, river basin organisations are not always the appropriate an-
swer to problems of fit, and secondly, they can differ considerably with regard to their design and 
decision-making and discretionary powers. Ribot states that institutions created in the course of 
decentralisation processes in order to increase local (self-)governance are often short of both real 
“power transfers and accountable representation” of local communities (Ribot 2002: 1). This, 
however, may lead to a lack of legitimacy and ultimately a collapse of the new institutions. He 
describes a best practice case where “legal decentralization of natural resource management pro-
vides local authorities with executive (decision-making and implementation), legislative (rulemaking), 
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and judiciary (dispute-resolution) powers. Having meaningful discretionary powers in any or all of 
these three domains provides legitimacy for new democratic local authorities” (ibid: 6). 
To increase legitimacy of governance structures, Meadowcroft (2002) argues, it is impor-
tant to recognize the plurality of participating groups rather than to seek a perfect fit of institu-
tions and ecosystems. Moreover, a perfect fit would neglect the relevance of existing institutions 
“which result from long-term patterns of societal development” and “cannot simply be redrawn 
at will” (ibid: 177). He recommends a balanced composition of old and new structures: “Indeed, 
the most effective response [to environmental problems] may often involve drawing representa-
tives from pre-existing bodies into a context where a collaborative response to emergent issues 
can be constructed.” 
A river basin organisation always forms an additional scale within an existing – even if 
changing – institutional environment and decision-making powers remain distributed at different 
scales and levels. The appropriate scale or level for decisions on environmental policies and 
measures depends on the respective case. Marks and Hooghe (2004) distinguish between two 
contrasting types of institutions, type I shaped by general-purpose jurisdictions (like provinces in 
a federal state), type II shaped by task-specific jurisdictions (like river basin organisations). They 
underline the distinctive virtues of each type with regard to their “visions of collective decision-
making” (ibid. 2004: 29) and their form of addressing resource conflicts, and highlight their com-
plementary character (see also von Keitz and Kessler 2008 on the European Water Framework 
Directive). 
In general, Young (1999) recommends to shape institutions in such a way that the maxi-
mum compatibility between institutional attributes and biophysical properties is given. But this 
does not only involve the spatial scale. Young highlights the importance of managerial or coordi-
native capacities of institutional arrangements: “The principle conclusion is that sustainability in 
human-environment relations requires a commitment to creating arrangements that can manage 
functional interdependencies on a continuing basis rather than an exercise aimed at selecting the 
proper level of social organisation at which to respond to particular problems” (Young 2002: 86). 
The attempt to solve problems of fit through the “replacement of existing institutional 
units by institutions oriented around biophysical systems will inevitably create new boundary 
problems and fresh mismatches” (Moss 2004: 87). These new boundary problems then do no 
longer relate to spatial scales but to social and political spheres of influence. Two aspects become 
obvious: Firstly, the sheer complexity of social-environmental relations makes a perfect “fit” of 
institutions virtually impossible. Secondly, related to this, “boundaries separating institutional 
systems […] are often indistinct and difficult to identify with precision” (Young 2002: 83). The 
design of institutional arrangements as well as the coexistence of complementary and overlapping 
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jurisdictions leads to the question of cooperation and coordination and thus to the issue of insti-
tutional interplay. Here, vertical and horizontal interplay can be distinguished (see Figure 1).  
Problems of vertical interplay arise as consequences of multi-level interactions, e.g. be-
tween the different administrative levels. In water management, policy-making, regulation, and 
enforcement powers can be allocated among organisations at international or transboundary 
level, national or federal, provincial or state and municipal levels with their respective institutional 
arrangements (Moss 2004). Especially in the case of the establishment of a river basin organisa-
tion as a new administrative unit, institutions at all levels have to be adjusted to avoid institutional 
disorder with overlapping responsibilities or policy gaps.  
Horizontal interplay concerns linkages of institutions at the same level, e.g. of water using 
sectors within a river basin. Since IWRM aims at balancing the demands of all water users within 
a watershed or river basin, their respective institutional arrangements have to be taken into ac-
count. Possible conflicting sector institutions - like economic and environmental policies - have 
to be coordinated which eventually requires cooperation among administrative bodies of differ-
ent sectors. 
Moss (2004) sees the risk that the creation of new water institutions unavoidably leads to 
coordination problems, e.g. between institutions for water management planning on the one 
hand and for land-use planning on the other hand. The reason is that “the effective protection of 
water resources cannot be achieved by institutions of water management alone. The quality and 
quantity of water resources are affected by a wide range of human activities […] each framed by 
its own institutional arrangements” (ibid. 2003: 94). 
Since IWRM replaces sectoral approaches as well as pure top-down management ap-
proaches, both problems of horizontal and vertical interplay have to be addressed. The biggest 
challenge, however, seems to be the simultaneous solution of problems of fit and interplay. Fol-
lowing the line of argument it can be concluded that the better the spatial fit the more consider-
able the problems of interplay. It seems that the spatial fit can only be achieved at the expense of 
interplay (Moss 2003). IWRM therefore never provides a blueprint, and a balanced institutional 
design has always to be attuned to the particular situation. 
3 Water Governance in Mongolia 
Mongolia has been divided into different administrative units since the foundation of the Peo-
ple’s Republic in 1924. Notwithstanding a federal appearance, the ruling Mongolian People’s 
Revolutionary Party (MPRP) pursued a type of Democratic Centralism until the end of the Soviet 
era in 1990. It was characterized by central leadership and planning authority while the “democ-
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ratic” component was limited to the election of political representatives. And “there existed no 
division of powers in the administrative structures. This was only a division of labour under di-
rect control by the Party” (Tserenchimed 2009: 68, translation by authors). 
Today, the country consists of a central government with three levels of local governance. 
These are 21 aimags (provinces) plus the capital Ulaanbaatar, the aimags are again divided into 
soums (districts) and baghs (municipalities). With the 1992 Constitution first steps towards de-
centralisation were taken. A dual governance system was adopted in which the lower administra-
tive units had to “be organized on the basis of a combination of the principles of both self-
governance and central government” (Government of Mongolia 1992: Art. 59.1)3. Thus, legisla-
ture today comprises of the national parliament (Great Khural) and its counterparts on aimag, 
soum and bagh level4. The national government as main executive authority has its equivalence at 
each sub-national level where governors, representing the national government, are responsible 
for the implementation of national legislation (Government of Mongolia 2006). 
Responsibilities in Mongolia’s water sector are mainly determined by the 2004 Law on 
Water (Government of Mongolia 2004). Traditionally, water management has been highly cen-
tralized and fragmented at the same time, with various government agencies implementing water 
related policies for agriculture, industry or urban water supply. The introduction of the law im-
plied a shift towards a more stringent water policy. Nevertheless, “more than 20 organizations 
have some responsibility for aspects of the water sector under existing legislation” (Livingstone, 
Erdenechimeg et al. 2009: 15). 
According to the water law the main responsibility for water policy lies with the Ministry 
of Environment and Tourism. Aimag parliaments (Khurals) adopt management programs which 
are submitted by River Basin Councils and the Governor. Khurals at aimag and soum level are 
responsible for monitoring the implementation of the water legislation. Budgets for implementa-
tion measures are approved by soum Khurals based on estimations of the governors. The aimag 
and soum governors are responsible for the management of water exploitation, protection and 
restoration activities. Aimag governors also issue water use permissions for water uses between 
50 and 100 m3 per day, soum governors based on decisions by the Water Agency, the aimag de-
partment of environment or the soum ranger, depending on the amount of water that is sup-
posed to be used. The Public Meetings at bagh level predominantly regulate the possession and 
use of wells within their territory. 
 
                                                 
3 All citations of Mongolian laws are taken from the translations by the Asia Foundation (in cooperation with the 
Dutch government) in the „Compendium of Laws“ (The Asia Foundation 2008). 
4 On bagh level: Public Meeting. 
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Figure 2: Responsibilities in Mongolia’s Water Sector (simplified). Source: by authors. 
 
Under the auspices of the Ministry of Environment two key organisations were estab-
lished to ensure both the implementation and coordination of water policies and the National 
Water Program which is currently under revision.5 
In 2000 the National Water Committee (NWC) was founded to coordinate and integrate 
the activities of the water related ministries. The number of participating ministries was reduced 
from ten to six in 2008 and today comprises the Ministries of Environment and Tourism; Mining 
and Energy; Roads, Transportation, Construction and Urban Development; Health; Food, Agri-
culture and Light Industry; and Defence. Head of the Water Committee is the Minister of Envi-
ronment and Tourism, and the steering committee consists of the state secretaries of the five 
other ministries. Besides its coordination tasks, the committee is also taking part in the formula-
tion of the National Water Program and is responsible for submitting it to the parliament and 
government. Additional duties are the development of guidelines for the establishment of River 
Basin Councils and to give advice to the government (NWC, pers. comm. 2009). 
Complementary to the NWC in 2005 the Water Authority (WA) was founded which 
serves as the government’s implementing agency. It also shall support the vertical coordination 
                                                 
5 According to www.dauriarivers.org/mongolia-water-program/ a draft version has been approved by the Standing 
Committee of the Great State Khural on Nature, Environment, Food and Agriculture on April 15th, 2010. 
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and cooperation from ministries at national to the private sector at local level.6 Based on informa-
tion gained through nation-wide data collection and monitoring the authority’s duty is to deter-
mine the amount of water used by each sector and to issue water use permissions for uses of 
more than 100m3 per day. With support of the Dutch development cooperation the authority is 
also engaged in the development of a national IWRM strategy. 
Monitoring of water uses is carried out mainly by inspectors of the General Agency for 
Specialized Inspection (GASI), the main supervisory agency of the government, and includes 
inspection and sanctioning of non-compliance with environmental legislation. Additionally water 
guardians, employees of the National Agency for Meteorology and Environmental Monitoring 
(NAMEM), are responsible to monitor water levels and quality at soum level. By law, monitoring 
of water uses is additionally conducted by the aimag departments of the agricultural and the envi-
ronmental ministries at aimag level. 
An additional layer of water governance was introduced in the 2004 water law with the 
objective of establishing river basin councils. According to the water law the councils are sup-
posed to “engage citizens in local water management for protection of water resources, its effec-
tive use and restoration” (Government of Mongolia 2004, Art. 19.1). This probably marks the 
most important alteration in water governance since planning and monitoring are supposed to be 
delegated to the basin level. The following sections will elaborate on problems of fit and interplay 
observed in the process Mongolia’s reforms of water resources management, as well as attempts 
to address these problems. 
4 Decentralisation, Fit and Institutional Interplay in Mongolia 
Problems of Fit 
In 2009 Mongolia’s river basins were officially delineated based on hydrological criteria and the 
economic relevance of the respective basins. Accordingly, 29 river basins were defined. Figure 3 
outlines these river basins on the one hand and aimag boundaries on the other. If we look at the 
matching of institutions and river basins, it becomes evident that the decentralisation process – 
the transfer of water management duties and economic responsibilites to the aimag and soum 
levels – itself led to problems of spatial fit: With the lower administrative levels gaining more 
decision-power, there is the risk that unilateral decisions of respective local parliaments lead to 
transboundary negative external effects. As figure 3 shows most of the river basins lie transverse 
to provincial borders, and this picture exponentiates at soum level. 
 
                                                 
6 See website of the Water Authority (www.water.mn). 
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Figure 3: River Basins in Mongolia, Source: Batbayar (2009). Bright lines indicate aimags, grey 
areas indicate river basins. 
 
At the same time, the water law has made provisions for the establishment of river basin 
councils. This can be understood as an implicit response to spatial mismatches. According to the 
water law, the councils’ duties are the development of river basin management plans to be ap-
proved by respective Khural(s) and to monitor their implementation, to evaluate water uses, envi-
ronmental impact assessment fulfilment etc., to organize caretaking of water sources and to 
provide technical assistance on proper water utilization (Art. 19.6). Members of a council shall 
consist of up to 15 people representing local administration, the aimags’ department of environ-
ment, representatives from agriculture and industry, NGOs, scientists, GASI, and ordinary citi-
zens (Government of Mongolia 2004, Art. 19.4). The duty of appointing chairpersons and 
members stays with government authorities and depends on the administrative scope of the re-
spective basins.7 Financial sources shall include a part of local budget from water users fees, sup-
port by water users, contributions by voluntary foundations and others (Annex Reg. 187 Part V). 
To date, eleven councils have been established at least on paper (WA, pers. comm. 2009). 
NGOs and donor organisations (WWF Mongolia and the Dutch development cooperation) have 
been supporting the process in three cases, and the RBCs in these three cases are generally con-
sidered as functioning (Quelle?). Hence, the government just started with the set up of RBCs. At 
                                                 
7 In the case of a river crossing two or more aimags the Minister of Environment and Tourism will appoint the 
council members on the basis of the submission of the respective aimags’ parliaments. If a river crosses two or more 
soums within one aimag, the aimag’s Khural have to appoint the members, and for a river within one soum the 
soum’s Khural is responsible (Water Law, Art. 19.2). 
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the same time, it turns out that a range of questions remains with regard to the RBCs remains 
open at this point.  
Given the range of RBC functions mentioned in the water law (see above), the first ques-
tion is which of these tasks can sensibly be fulfilled by RBCs and which might rather be the re-
sponsibility of other sector organisations. It can be assumed that the RBC’s main task will be to 
draw up RBM plans. With respect to the other tasks, the question is to what extent it has the 
capacity and the financial resources also to engage in monitoring and technical assistance at the 
local level. One interviewee noticed that “[…] the exact role of the basin council is not yet crys-
tallized out, whether they are really the implementer. If it would be like that, how would they 
generate their resources, financial resources in particular? There is very little arranged for that” 
(Dutch IWRM Project, pers. comm. 2009). 
However, even with respect to drawing up RBM plans, the question is whether the coun-
cil, in its current design, has indeed the capacity to do so. Firstly, the council constitutes a rather 
heterogeneous group of people who representing different interests, but not necessarily having 
the technical planning capacity. And secondly the scope of a river basin to be managed may con-
stitute a challenge: “[…] particularly when you start with councils which are composed of stake-
holders, you have to really take into account the reach, the communication between the edges of 
the area, management capacity of the people involved, and if you take a very large area […] for an 
organisation like a very young basin council it would be unmanageable, communication is virtual 
impossible, you cannot expect that people have the knowledge of all the area” (ibid.). 
A further question relates to the financing of the council. In order to establish a council, 
financing has to be proven towards the respective entity responsible for the application, i.e. the 
Water Authority or the department of environment. So the council is predominantly self depend-
ent in finding sources of finance. Money is particularly needed to pay the chairperson and secre-
tary who shall be permanent staff (WA, pers. comm. 2009), but possibly also to subcontract more 
detailed planning. While an unspecified part shall be provided out of the local budget earned 
from water use fees, so far, fees are extremely low, their collection is incomplete and local gov-
ernment have to transfer 40 % of this budget to higher government levels. Further, with respect 
to the idea that an additional endowment be raised from private sector, NGOs or through the 
establishment of a foundation which private entity or NGO can be expected to contribute to-
wards the RBCs? Since the law does not provide any rules for public financing mechanisms, the 
efficacy of the single councils will also highly depend on their ability to raise funds (WWF, pers. 
comm. 2009). 
Finally, there are open questions relating to the legal status of the RBCs. A council’s legal 
status turned out to be problematic for the first time when it came to the registration with the tax 
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authority. By law, only three legal statuses exist, i.e. the state organisation, non-governmental 
organisation, or company, “and a river basin council is of course no company, but also no NGO 
or state organisation” (WA, pers. comm. 2009). Because their membership consists not only of 
government officials but also of private sector representatives and citizens, a council can not be 
entitled a state organisation. An interim solution was found by giving the councils an interim 
status as “non-governmental entity providing services to the state” (WWF, pers. comm. 2009).8 
As mentioned above, the set up of RBCs is still in an early stage and at least for some of 
these questions answers may be found. However, solutions to the questions of capacity and fi-
nancing remain crucial if RBC’s are to be effective in Mongolia. 
 
Problems of Horizontal Interplay 
Problems of horizontal interplay, i.e. between water using sector institutions, become ob-
vious e.g. at Mongolia’s national level, when looking at the allocation of responsibilities among 
government entities which is still characterized by a strong sectoral segregation. At least six min-
istries – those that are represented in the NWC – are responsible for water issues.  
As a response to this challenge, the National Water Committee was established to achieve 
cooperation between the ministries and to coordinate activities in the water sector (NWC, pers. 
comm. 2009). With its members being state secretaries it consists of high-level representatives. 
The NWC is supported by a technical committee (NWC, pers. comm. 2009). Nevertheless, pro-
cedures for institutional cooperation are hardly defined and largely depend on individual willing-
ness. For the time being, the NWC does not have enough influence to actually channel the 
ministries’ activities: “[…] we have so many committees, National Committee for Climate 
Change, National Committee for Desertification, National Committee for Air Pollution, and all 
these committees are waiting on the decision how to integrate their works. In early 2000 the 
Mongolian political life found one solution to integrate some ministries’ activities, […] but a 
committee, if it doesn’t have enough empowerment or rights, it cannot do that” (WWF, pers. 
comm. 2009). 
Also the Water Authority could play a facilitating role, but faces problems regarding its 
influence on ministries and other government agencies. As a result, information and data on wa-
ter resources that actually should be available in the Water Authority are withhold by respective 
specialist organizations. For example, “[…] only the Minerals Agency has knowledge on water 
use in mining, only the Ministry of Agriculture has information on land use, and their coopera-
tion is bad. As far as drinking water is concerned, only the Construction Planning Agency is re-
                                                 
8 An amendment of the water law is envisaged for the 4th session of the Great Khural (parliament) in October 2010 
(WWF, pers. comm. 2010). 
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sponsible, the Ministry of Energy for hydro-power, ground water drinking water resources are 
subject to the Ministry of Environment. The Ministry of Health analyses water quality. The Water 
Authority actually is not able to take reasonable decisions because the cooperation with the min-
istries is not working. Every agency has its own interests […]” (Water Institute, pers. comm. 
2009). 
It can be argued that the coordination and cooperation problems at the horizontal level 
are also due to the fact that both the NWC and the WA are affiliated to the Ministry of Envi-
ronment and Tourism, a ministry which is attached less importance to, compared with, for in-
stance, the Ministry of Mining and Energy (UNDP, pers. comm. 2009). 
The problem of the Water Authority’s minor influence has become apparent in the case 
of the government program which intends to achieve food sovereignty by increasing irrigated 
agriculture. The Ministry of Agriculture supports investments in irrigation technology with inter-
est-free loans while the Water Authority has taken up a critical position towards the program 
(Ministry of Agriculture, WA, pers. comm. 2009). The WA sees the danger of further resources 
depletion if the irrigated area is expanded particularly because to date no price for water used in 
the agricultural sector exists, only for service where it applies. According to the Law on Fees for 
Water Use only irrigation of pastures is explicitly exempted from water use fees (Government of 
Mongolia 1995, Art. 8). But the wording of the law is very imprecise regarding the use of water 
for irrigating crops, and a government resolution for a final clarification is missing (Ministry of 
Agriculture, pers. comm. 2009). The Water Agency advocates pricing in the agricultural sector, 
not only for crop production but also for irrigating pastures. It is not yet clear whether the Minis-
try of Agriculture supports this attempt. In addition, existing legislation forms a hurdle for the 
Water Authority to change the water price system, since at least 15 related laws would have to be 
amended as well (WA, pers. comm. 2009). However, all interviewees mentioned the difficulties of 
introducing water prices especially in a country like Mongolia where access to water is crucial for 
the economic development, and where advocating for prices would mean a “political suicide”.9 
Another example for cooperation problems was the approval procedure of the Taishir 
Hydropower project at the Zavkhan River where the Water Authority didn’t have a say. The pro-
ject was created as a Clean Development Mechanism-project by a Japanese company and the 
Energy Research and Development Centre of the Ministry of Energy and Mining. As one of the 
biggest dams in Mongolia the hydropower plant was supposed to provide electricity to the Gobi 
Altai and Zavkhan provinces. Although the dam has already been built, up to December 2009 the 
project was not approved by the government because of too low water levels. During the ap-
proximately two years it takes to fill the reservoir with water, not only local people are suffering 
                                                 
9 Interview WWF Mongolia (May 2009). 
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from water scarcity: “Controversial issues include environmental concerns, such as the destruc-
tion of a freshwater habitat for plants and animals and the negative impact on fish migration, as 
well as the temporary disappearance of water sources for people and livestock downstream as the 
large man-made reservoirs take years to fill” (Wilson 2009). A Water Authority official claims that 
there was no consultation with his agency regarding available water resources or possible impacts: 
“And about this dam, the Water Authority and the Ministry of Environment and Tourism cannot 
say anything because this dam is working under the Ministry of Energy and Mining” (WA, pers. 
comm. 2009). 
Apparently, there is no clear distinction between the ministries’ and the Water Authority’s 
tasks. A representative from the WA (2009) states: “[…] the institutional system or structure in 
the water sector in Mongolia is not clear. The government has its own Water Authority which is 
responsible for water resources, but so many ministers and organisations are still responsible for 
water issues. E.g. water for agriculture and animals: the Ministry of Agriculture. Water quality: 
who is responsible is not clear – we [i.e. the Water Authority] or the Ministry of Health?” 
 
Problems of vertical interplay 
The decentralisation process in Mongolia created different levels of administrative and 
organisational responsibilities and thus also led to certain problems of vertical institutional inter-
play. This holds particularly true for the application of national law at the subordinate levels. A 
fuzzy picture of responsibilities at the national level is passed downwards and inevitably leads to 
poor implementation at the local level. An explicit assignment of responsibilities is often missing.  
According to the Law on Environmental Protection environmental monitoring is carried 
out by the control agency GASI. The Law on Water, however, lays out responsibility regarding 
the monitoring of the implementation of water users’ duties that result from environmental im-
pact assessments to the RBCs (Art. X), while the Law on Environmental Impact Assessment 
assigns the monitoring to a “licensed economic entity” (Government of Mongolia 1998, Art. 11). 
The water law, moreover, appoints the Khurals of aimags and soums as well as the local depart-
ments of environment. Additionally, the Water Authority is responsible for the monitoring of 
changes in water resources. 168 NAMEM water guardians monitor water levels at soum level but 
they are not mentioned in the law (Asia Foundation, WA, pers. comm. 2009). Weak water re-
sources and water uses monitoring, thus, can be regarded as problem of vertical institutional in-
terplay since it discloses overlapping, unclear responsibilities and challenges regarding the 
implementation and enforcement of national legislation at the different administrative levels. 
All these organisations face different challenges, and next to overlapping responsibilities 
they are understaffed and underfunded or staffs are insufficiently trained. The GASI has staff 
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members at the local level, but they are limited to 4-5 State inspectors per aimag (WA pers. 
comm. 2009). Rangers have the duty to “protect natural resources in the area” for which they are 
responsible (Government of Mongolia 1995, Art. 28.2). The rangers’ territories cover up to 
120.000 ha in a forestry-steppe area or up to 800.000 ha in a desert area (ibid. 1995, Art. 26.7), a 
rather huge area given they have to monitor the implementation of not only water legislation but 
the entire environmental legislation. The Water Authority has no branches at the provincial and 
district level which would facilitate cooperation with local government entities. Instead it has to 
act through the aimag departments of environment. These departments, again, are not endowed 
with branches at soum level. Thus, the local level where monitoring should actually take place, 
remains virtually understaffed. With regard to the implementation of the national water program, 
a representative from the Water Committee stated: “We have a problem at the soum level; there 
is no special person, because all the functions are completed by the rangers, and some of them 
are not specialized” (NWC, pers. comm. 2009). 
Water use, especially in agriculture and mining, therefore remains virtually uncontrolled. 
Still 60 % of groundwater for commercial purposes are withdrawn without necessary licences or 
water meters (Dore and Nagpal 2007). According to the Water Authority (pers. comm. 2009), 
about two thirds of the mining companies in fact use water meters, but since the monitoring is 
weak, unsteadiness in their usage can also be observed, and some companies just dig holes and 
get water through bank-filtration. 
Weak monitoring can be traced back to weak capacity and capabilities, but also to an 
“imbalance between the assignment of implementation responsibilities and the allocation of 
budget resources” (ADB 2005: 53) which holds true for the entire environmental sector. Tortell, 
Borjigdkhan et al. (2008) claim that a coherent intergovernmental financial transfer system to 
finance effective management and monitoring is missing. Because of the insufficient financial 
strength of the responsible agencies and organisations in the environment and water sector nec-
essary equipment for monitoring is missing (Tortell, Borjigdkhan et al. 2008). Local governments 
do rely on fines and penalties to finance environmental management which in addition leads to a 
situation where users’ compliance to environmental legislation is postponed. In fact 60 % of en-
vironmental fee revenues remain within the aimag budgets (except of fees from the mining sec-
tor), but only 35 % of these revenues are reinvested in environment and resource protection if at 
all, the remaining 65 % aren’t earmarked (Government of Mongolia 2000).10 In 2003 revenues 
from the use of natural resources exceeded expenditures for resource protection by five times 
(ADB 2005).  
                                                 
10 The Governor of Darkhan Uul states that so far nothing has been reinvested in his aimag (pers. comm. 2009). 
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Tortell, Borjigkhan et al. (2008) laud the decentralisation of environmental protection in 
general, but also state that there remains “inadequate capacity, lack of credibility and legal confu-
sion” (ibid.: 27).  
Despite Mongolia’s division into different administrative units, politics still show a cen-
tralized character. Some even call the state being just a “de-concentrated state administration with 
self-governing elements” (Tserenchimed 2009: 127). Effective institutional interplay requires that 
all groups or stakeholders affected by water policies are represented in the respective boards or 
committees (Fischhendler 2008). But most of the policy documents were developed only at na-
tional level without the involvement of local governments or the civil society which are essential 
for their implementation (UNESCO-WWAP 2006; WWF Mongolia Programme Office 2007). 
With the water policy reform in 2004 public participation in water management has become an 
important issue. The public shall not only be represented in the RBCs but also actively engage in 
“restoration and caretaking activities of sources and rivers, streams, and springs, afforestation and 
plantation of seedlings, augmenting source of water, and prevention from pollution” (cf. 
Government of Mongolia 2004, Art. 18) as well as monitoring. The development of river basin 
management plans by the river basin council members thus forms another attempt to address the 
issue of missing vertical interaction, but its success remains to be seen. 
5 Conclusion and Outlook 
The aim of this paper was to analyze progress and problems in the institutionalization of IWRM 
in Mongolia as an example for a developing and transition country. Apart from revealing com-
mon problems of sustainably implementing natural resources management in developing coun-
tries like a lack of financial resources and capacities, particular problems of institutional change 
conditions resulting from the country’s transition were analysed. 
Problems of fit and interplay occurred alongside Mongolia’s transition and decentraliza-
tion processes. At the same time, considerable steps were taken that have potential to address 
these problems. A new water law was introduced, aiming at an integrated water resources man-
agement. Problems of fit are being addressed by introducing river basin organisations which are 
supposed to balance local water user interests but do now face challenges concerning mandate, 
capacity, legal form, financing and quorum. A National Water Authority is supposed to stream-
line water related activities at different administrative levels and may thereby tackle problems of 
vertical interplay. The National Water Committee was established in order to foster cooperation 
of the water related ministries and may thus address problems of horizontal interplay. But, long-
established institutions and strong sectoral segregation resist efforts for reform. Newly estab-
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lished posts are often endowed with little resources for enforcement. Additionally, Mongolia’s 
politics still show a strong centralized character - a relict from the soviet era - which hinders real 
control over resources by local governments and participation of the public.  
On the one hand, it may be argued that the endeavour to establish River Basin Councils 
represents not only a tool to address problems of fit, but also to deal with problems of horizontal 
and vertical interplay. Given the composition of the RBCs, they have the potential to coordinate 
both between different sectoral interests and between different administrative levels at the basin 
scale. Hence, in the case of Mongolia as a developing and transition country, with little horizontal 
and vertical interplay in place, theoretically RBCs have the potential to address problems of fit 
and interplay simultaneously – and not to solve problems of fit at the expense of interplay as 
suggested by Moss (2003) for the case of Germany as a developed country. However, this really 
hinges on the effectiveness of the RBCs including their future human resources and financial 
capacities. 
The concepts of institutional fit and interplay are valuable tools to structure the analysis 
of institutional arrangements conductive and obstructive towards IWRM. The aspect of institu-
tional fit can be applied to river basins and their respective organisations and institutions. The 
approaches of vertical and horizontal interplay help to depict relationships between the different 
administrative levels on the one hand and the sectoral institutions at each of these levels on the 
other. Nevertheless it is hardly possible to explicitly classify a problem regarding the institution-
alization of IWRM as either only problem of fit or problem of vertical or horizontal interplay. 
Additionally, the approach is not sufficient to explain the underlying reasons for success 
and failure of certain attempts to institutionalize IWRM. According to the Global Corruption 
Report 2008 water problems are not so much a physical problem but often a water politics crisis, 
“a crisis in the use of power and authority over water” (Transparency International 2008: 4). 
Since power is always held by certain actors – individual or groups – we propose to amend the 
former approaches with actor centred explanatory approaches. New governance structures and 
institutions offer new political spheres that are occupied by different political actors, a phenome-
non that has been described as politics of scale (Swyngedouw 2004; Görg 2007). There are two 
main reasons for the choice of the politics of scale approach as add-on to the fit and interplay 
approaches. First, the scale debate is able to capture the ongoing political and institutional dy-
namics in today’s Mongolia since it deals with the process of scaling and rescaling. Second, it 





Abdullayev, I. (2009). Integrated Water Management in Central Asia: way of reform or way of 
getting more money for ailing sector? Water Policy Dynamics in State-Centric Regimes 
Workshop, March 24 / 25, 2009. ZEF, Bonn. 
ADB (2005). Country Environmental Analysis (CEA) Mongolia. Asian Development Bank. 
Bandaragoda, D. J. (2000). A Framework for Institutional Analysis for Water Resources 
Management in a River Basin Context. Working Paper 5. International Water 
Management Institute. Colombo, Sri Lanka. 
Batbayar, Z. (2009). Integrated Water Resources Management: The National Strategy for 
Mongolia. MoMo Conference, Sept. 8-11, 2009, Ulaanbaatar. 
Björklund, G. (2001). Water Management in Developing Countries - Policy and Priorities for EU 
Development Cooperation. SIWI Report 12. Stockholm International Water Institute 
(SIWI). Stockholm. 
Dombrowsky, I. (2005). Integriertes Wasserressourcen-Management als Koordinationsproblem. 
Integriertes Wasserressourcen-Management (IWRM) - Ein Konzept in die Praxis 
überführen. S. Neubert, W. Scheumann, A. v. Edig and W. Huppert. Baden-Baden, 
Nomos: 61-82. 
Dombrowsky, I. (2008). "Integration in the Management of International Waters: Economic 
Perspectives on a Global Policy Discourse." Global Governance 14: 455-477. 
Dore, G. and T. Nagpal (2007). "Urban transition in Mongolia: pursuing sustainability in a unique 
environment." Environment 48(6): 12-24. 
Edig, A. v. and H. v. Edig (2005). Integriertes Wasserressourcen-Management - Schlüssel zur 
nachhaltigen Entwicklung. Integriertes Wasserressourcen-Management (IWRM) - Ein 
Konzept in die Praxis überführen. S. Neubert, W. Scheumann, A. v. Edig and W. 
Huppert. Baden-Baden, Nomos: 135-157. 
Ekstrom, J. A. and O. R. Young (2009). "Evaluating Functional Fit between a Set of Institutions 
and Ecosystems." Ecology and Society 14(2). 
FAO. (2009). "Fact Sheet Mongolia."   Retrieved Dec 03, 2009. 
Fischhendler, I. (2008). "Institutional Conditions for IWRM: The Israeli Case." Ground Water 
46(1): 91-102. 
Folke, C., L. Pritchard, et al. (2007). "The Problem of Fit between Ecosystems and Institutions: 
Ten Years Later." Ecology and Society 12(1). 
Galaz, V., P. Olsson, et al. (2008). The Problem of Fit among Biophysical Systems, 
Environmental and Resource Regimes, and Broader Governance Systems: Insights and 
Emerging Challenges. Institutions and Environmental Change - Pricipal Findings, 
Applications, and Research Frontiers. O. R. Young, L. A. King and H. Schroeder. 
Cambridge, MIT Press. 
Global Water Partnership (2000). Integrated Water Resources Management. TAC Background 
Papers No.4. Stockholm. 
Görg, C. (2007). "Landscape governance: The “politics of scale” and the “natural” conditions of 
places." Geoforum 38(5): 954-966. 
Government of Mongolia (1992). The Constitution of Mongolia. Ulaanbatar. 
Government of Mongolia (1995). Law of Mongolia on Environmental Protection. Ulaanbaatar. 
Government of Mongolia (1995). Law of Mongolia on Fees for the Use of Water and Mineral 
Water. Ulaanbaatar. 
Government of Mongolia (1998). Law of Mongolia on Environmental Impact Assessments. 
Ulaanbaatar. 
Government of Mongolia (2000). Mongolian Law on Reinvestment of Natural Resources Use 
Fees for Conservation and Restoration of Natural Resources  
 21 
Government of Mongolia (2004). Law of Mongolia on Water. Ulaanbaatar. 
Government of Mongolia (2006). Law of Mongolia on Administrative and Territorial Units of 
Mongolia and their Governance. Ulaanbaatar. 
Hedden-Dunkhorst, B. (2005). Südafrika auf dem Weg zum integrierten Wasserressourcen-
Management: Erfahrungen mit einem neuen Konzept. Integriertes Wasserressourcen-
Management (IWRM) - Ein Konzept in die Praxis überführen. S. Neubert, W. 
Scheumann, A. v. Edig and W. Huppert. Baden-Baden, Nomos: 159-178. 
Herrfahrdt-Pähle, E. (2010). Introducing Catchment Management - The Case of South Africa. 
DIE Discussion Paper 3/2010. Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik. Bonn. 
Herrfahrdt, E., M. Kipping, et al. (2006). Water governance in the Kyrgyz agricultural sector: on 
its way to Integrated Water Resources Management? Studies 14. Deutsches Institut für 
Entwicklungspolitik. Bonn. 
Huitema, D., E. Mostert, et al. (2009). "Adaptive Water Governance: Assessing the Institutional 
Prescriptions of Adaptive (Co-)Management from a Governance Perspective and 
Defining a Research Agenda." Ecology and Society 14(1). 
Klaphake, A. (2005). Integriertes Flussgebietsmanagement in Brasilien? - Institutionelle und 
politökonomische Aspekte der Reformen im brasilianischen Wassersektor. Integriertes 
Wasserressourcen-Management (IWRM) - Ein Konzept in die Praxis überführen. S. 
Neubert, W. Scheumann, A. v. Edig and W. Huppert. Baden-Baden, Nomos: 179-200. 
Lankford, B. A., D. J. Merrey, et al. (2007). From integrated to expedient: An adaptive framework 
for river basin management in developing countries. IWMI Research Report 110. 
International Water Management Institute. Colombo, Sri Lanka. 
Livingstone, A., C. Erdenechimeg, et al. (2009). Needs Assessment on Institutional Capacity for 
Water Governance in Mongolia. United Nations Development Program (UNDP). 
Ulaanbaatar. 
Lkhagvadorj, A. (2010). Fiscal federalism and decentralization in Mongolia. Potsdam, 
Universitätsverlag Potsdam. 
Marks, G. and L. Hooghe (2004). Contrasting Visions of Multi-level Governance. Multi-level 
Governance. I. Bache and M. Flinders. Oxford, Oxford University Press: 15-30. 
Meadowcroft, J. (2002). "Politics and scale: some implications for environmental governance." 
Landscape and Urban Planning 61: 169-179. 
Mitchell, B. (2005). "Integrated water resource management, institutional arrangements, and land-
use planning." Environment and Planning 37: 1335-1352. 
MoMo (2009). Integrated Water Resources Management for Central Asia - Model Region 
Mongolia: Kharaa River Case Study - Main Findings Summary Report. Helmholtz-
Zentrum für Umweltforschung - UFZ. Magdeburg. 
Moss, T. (2003). Solving Problems of 'Fit' at the Expense of Problems of 'Interplay'? The Spatial 
Reorganisation of Water Management Following the EU Water Framework Directive. 
How Institutions Change - Perspectives on Social Learning in Global and Local 
Environmental Contexts. H. Breit, A. Engels, T. Moss and M. Troja. Opladen, Leske + 
Budrich: 85-122. 
Moss, T. (2003b). Raumwissenschaftliche Perspektiverweiterung zur Umsetzung der EU-
Wasserrahmenrichtlinie Das Flussgebiet als Handlungsraum. Institutionenwandel durch 
die EU-Wasserrahmenrichtlinie aus raumwissenschaftlichen Perspektiven T. Moss. 
Münster, LIT Verlag: 21-43. 
Moss, T. (2004). "The governance of land use in river basins: prospects for overcoming problems 
of institutional interplay with the EU Water Framework Directive." Land Use Policy 21: 
85-94. 
North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press. 
Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective 
Action. New York, Cambridge University Press. 
 22 
Ribot, J. C. (2002). Democratic Decentralization of Natural Resources - Institutionalizing Popular 
Participation. W. R. Institute. Washington D.C. 
Rogers, P. and A. W. Hall (2003). Effective Water Governance. TEC Background Papers No. 7. 
Global Water Partnership - Technical Committee (TEC). Stockholm. 
Saleth, R. M. and A. Dinar (2000). "Institutional Changes in Global Water Sector: Trends, 
Patterns, and Implications." Water Policy 2: 175-199. 
Sehring, J. (2009). The Politics of Water Institutional Reform in Neopatrimonial States - A 
Comparative Analysis of Kyrgystan and Tajikistan. Wiesbaden, VS Verlag für 
Sozialwissenschaften. 
Shah, T. (2007). Issues in Reforming Informal Water Economies of Low-Income Countries: 
Examples from India and Elsewhere Community-Based Water Law and Water Resource 
Management Reform in Developing Countries. B. van Koppen, M. Giordano and J. 
Butterwoth. Wallingford, UK, CAB International: 65-95. 
SRU (2004). Umweltgutachten 2004 des Rates von Sachverständigen für Umweltfragen. 
Deutscher Bundestag - 15. Wahlperiode. Drucksache 15/3600. 
Starnes, C. N. (2003). The Dynamics of Institutional Change in Transition Economies. Texas. 
Swyngedouw, E. (2004). Scaled Geographies - Nature, Place, and the Politics of Scale. Scale and 
Geographic Inquiry: Nature, Society, and Method. E. Sheppard and R. McMaster. 
Oxford, Blackwell Publishing Ltd.: 129-153. 
The Asia Foundation (2008). Compendium of Laws - A Mongolian Citizens Reference Book. 
Ulaanbaatar. 
Theesfeld, I. (2003). "Constraints on Collective Action in a Transitional Economy: The Case of 
Bulgaria's Irrigation Sector." World Development 32(2): 251-271. 
Theesfeld, I. and I. Boevsky (2005). "Reviving Pre-Socialist Cooperative Traditions: The Case of 
Water Syndicates in Bulgaria." Sociologia Ruralis 45(3): 171-186. 
Tortell, P., A. Borjigdkhan, et al. (2008). Insitutional Structures for Environmental Management 
in Mongolia. Ulaanbaatar and Wellington. 
Transparency International (2008). Global Corruption Report 2008 - Corruption in the Water 
Sector. Cambridge, UK. 
Tserenchimed, O. (2009). Untersuchung zur Reform der mongolischen Staatsverwaltung. Berlin. 
UNESCO-WWAP (2006). Water - A shared responsibility. The United Nations World Water 
Development Report 2. Paris / New York. 
van der Zaag, P. (2005). "Integrated Water Resources Management: Relevant concept or 
irrelevant buzzword? A capacity building and research agenda for Southern Africa." 
Physics and Chemistry of the Earth 30: 867-871. 
van Koppen, B., M. Giordano, et al. (2007). Community-based Water Law and Water Resource 
Management Reform in Developing Countries: Rationale, Contents and Key Messages. 
Community-Based Water Law and Water Resource Management Reform in Developing 
Countries. B. van Koppen, M. Giordano and J. Butterwoth. Wallingford, UK, CAB 
International: 1-11. 
von Keitz, S. and P. Kessler (2008). "Grenzen des Flussgebietsmanagements - Folgt die 
Wasserwirtschaft dem falschen Ansatz?" Korrespondenz Wasserwirtschaft 1(7): 354-360. 
Wilson, A. (2009). Hydro Power Presents Solutions, Problems UB Post online, Dec. 11, 2009. 
WWF Mongolia Programme Office (2007). Freshwater Issues in Mongolia and WWF Mongolia's 
planned contribution towards a solution. 
Young, O. R. (1999). Institutional Diemnsions of Global Environmental Change. IHDP Report 
No.9. Bonn, IHDP. 
Young, O. R. (2002). The Institutional Dimensions of Environmental Change - Fit, Interplay, 
and Scale. Cambridge MA / London, MIT Press. 
 
Moss 2003b:  
 
